In 1979 Richard Statman proved, using proof-theory, that the purely implicational fragment of Intuitionistic Logic (M→) is PSPACE-complete. He showed a polynomialy bounded translation from full Intuitionistic Propositional Logic into its implicational fragment. By the PSPACEcompleteness of S4, proved by Ladner, and the Gödel translation from S4 into Intuitionistic Logic, the PSPACE-completeness of M→ is drawn. The subformula principle for a deductive system for a logic L states that whenever {γ1, . . . , γ k } ⊢L α there is a proof having every formula either as subformula of α or of some γi. In this work we extend Statman's result and show that any propositional (possibly modal) logic satisfying a particular statement of the subformula principle is shown to be PSPACEhard. As a consequence, EXPTIME-complete propositional logics, such as PDL and the common-knowledge epistemic logic with at least 2 agents satisfy this particular statement of the subformula principle, if and only if, PSPACE=EXPTIME.
Introduction
In [11] , R. Statman showed a polynomial-time reduction from Intuitionistic Propositional Logic into its implicational fragment. This reduction proves that Purely Implicational Minimal Logic is PSPACE-complete. The methods that Statman uses in [11] are based on proof-theory and Natural Deduction in Prawitz Style. The subformula principle for a Natural Deduction system N L for a logic L states that whenever α is provable from Γ, in L, there is a derivation of α from set of assumptions {δ 1 , . . . , δ k } ⊆ Γ built up only with subformulas of α and/or {δ 1 , . . . , δ k }. In this article we show that any propositional logic L with a Natural Deduction system that satisfies the subformula principle is PSPACEHard.
In [7] , it is shown a general approach to Natural Deduction that allows the definition of general introduction and elimination rules in a way that, any intuitionistic logical constant (or operator) that is expressible in terms of these general rules is also expressible by means of the intuitionistic logical constants (⊥, →, ∧, ¬ and ∨). Precisely, in [7] it is shown that any constant c determined by a set of introduction and elimination rules, in Natural Deduction style, is such that, there is a formula F (A 1 , . . . , A k ) built up with constants from {⊥, →, ∧, ¬, ∨}, and, c(A 1 , . . . , A k ) is provable, iff, F (A 1 , . . . , A k ) is provable in intuitionistic propositional logic. In order to prove this statement, namely, the functional completeness of intuitionistic logical constants, some proof-theoretical assumptions on the relationship between elimination and introduction rules are considered. Precisely, this assumptions have to do with the inversion principle that roughly states that the elimination rule for a logical constant c has to be a function of the introduction rules of this c. This means that the elimination rule is only determined by the introduction rules and this inversion principle 1 . Although strongly based in [7] , the results shown in the sequel do not explicitly need inversion principle. We do use a general form of introduction and elimination rules proposed in [7] and after extended by Roy Dickhoff and Nissim Francez to the term general-elimination harmony, such that, there is only one c-elimination rule associated to the many c-introduction rules. As we see in section 2, this general-elimination harmony assumption is not need, indeed. In [8] there is a very good discussion on the Higher-Level rules, proposed in [9] as an alternative and extension of Prawitz [7] , and the generalelimination harmony as well. Summing, our technique relies in the subformula property only, as it is stated in the definition 4 in the following section.
Section 2 shows our main result and in section 3 we discuss some consequences and applications of our main result. At the conclusion we discuss further possible investigations. At the conclusion we comments further investigations too.
2 Translating a propositional logic L into M → Consider a propositional logic L with Natural Deduction system having introduction and elimination rules according to the following general schema, which has as a c-introduction rule, as shown in figure 1 , deriving c(β 1 , . . . , β n , φ In elimination rules (see figure 2 ), φ j i , i = 1, j i , are called simple-minor premiss, for each j. The premisses χ are called discharging minor premisses (dminor premiss). The premiss c(β i , φ j ) is the major premiss of the elimination rule. There may be more than one introduction rule, but at most one elimination rule. This elimination rule has one discharging minor premiss for each introduction rule. In abstract proof-theory, we would require that the principle of inversion holds concerning the elimination and introduction rules. This usu- In what follwos we call operator whatever is the logical constant c. It might be a propositional connective or a modality, it is called operator both cases. A Natural Deduction system for a logic L is a set of introduction and/or elimination rules for the operators of L. Given a Natural Deduction system N L for a logic , the usual notions of derivation and proof of a formula from a set of assumptions are considered in this article. We remind the reader the denomination of formula occurrence, that is, an occurrence of a formula in some derivation or any other syntactic component of a proof. It is worth noting the difference between formula and formula occurrence. • δ i is a discharging minor premise of an application of a c-elim rule, in Π, and δ i+1 is its conclusion, or;
• δ i is a premise of an application of a c-intro rule, in Π, and δ i+1 is its conclusion, or;
• δ i is a simple-minor premise of an application of a c-intro rule, in Π, and δ i+1 is a formula occurrence dischargeg by this application of elimination rule, or;
• δ k is the conclusion of Π or the major premise of an application of c-elim rule in Π.
We call δ 0 , . . . , δ k a linking-sequence in Π. 
When a logic L has a system N L satisfying the subformula property, we say that the logic L itself satisfies the subformula property. The proof of the above proposition relies on the fact that a subsequence of a linking-sequence that is a subformula linking-sequence is a subformula linkingsequence too.
In what follows we define a translation ⋆ from L into M → , such that, α is provable in L, if and only if, α ⋆ is provable in M → . In order to define ⋆, we need auxiliary functions M and A, defined in the sequel. In the following definition, p ω is a notation used to uniquely identify the symbol p indexed by the string (word) ω. It this way we ensure that p is the unique propositional symbol that is named by means of the word ω, such that, p ω1 and p ω2 are equal, if and only if, ω 1 and ω 2 are the same word (string). We remenber that we call operator any propositional connective or modality. We consider that the logic L has a finite set {c 1 , . . . , c k } of operators. For reasons of readability, we do not consider the minimal implication → in this set, even in the case that the logic has it as one of its propositional connectives. As we will see, the implication is the only logical constant (operator) that is not translated.
The following definitions provide us axioms schema concerning each c-introduction and/or c-elimination rule. 
Definition 6 (ǫ-axiom) Consider a formula χ of a logic L and an elimination rule r for c, as shown in figure 2 instantiated to φ j , β i and χ. The ǫ-axiom concerning this rule schema and χ, denoted by ǫ(r, χ, β i , φ j ), is the following implicational formula:
For example, considering the usual ∨-introduction (∨−intro 1 and ∨−intro 2 ) and ∨-elimination (∨ − elim) natural deduction schemas, we have that: (1)
Definition 7 (Atomizing Operators) The mapping M from the language of L into the language of M → is defined inductively, as follows.

Atoms M(p) = p, if p is a propositional letter;
The second clause in definition 7 is only used when the language of L includes the minimal implication →. Otherwise it is not used and the translation is also well-defined. In the following we define an auxialiary function that for each formula α yields the set of implicational formulas that express the "deductive meaning"
2 of the elimination and introduction rules for each operator in L.
Definition 8 (Axiomatizing Operators)
Given a formula α in L, the mapping A α from the language of L into (finite) sets of formulas in the language of M → is defined inductively, as follows. 
Proof. Since L satisfies the subformula principle, we can consider that Π is a derivation satisfying the subformula principle. The proof proceeds by induction on the size of this derivation. The basis is the derivation of α from α itself, and hence, Π ′ is M(α) only. The inductive step is according the last rule applied in the derivation satisfying the subformula principle. There are only two (general) cases:
Last rule is a c m -intro rule. Then Π is as following:
Where the last rule is r, a c-introduction rule. Consider ι(r, β i , φ j , γ k ) the implicational formula related to c. By proposition 1 Π figure 4 shows the existence of a derivation of the translated conclusion from the translated premises. ǫ(r, M(χ), M(β i ), ϕ i,j ) is the ǫ-axiom that implements the implicational elimination on the implicational fragment of minimal logic. We remind the reader that M(c(β i , φ j )) is p c(βi,φ j ) . The double inference bar means iterated →-elimination rule applications. We check and find out that the derivation in figure 4 satisfy the lemma.
We now can provide a translation that preserves theorems in L as direct consequence of lemma 1 Proposition 2 Let L be a propositional logic satisfying the subformula principle. Consider the following translation ⋆ from formulas of L into formulas of
We can see that the size of α ⋆ is O(m 3 ), if m is the size of α, thus we have that.
Theorem 1 If L satisfies the subformula principle then the problem of knowing whether α, a formula of L, is provable or not, is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. From the PSPACE-completeness of provability in M → and the polynomial reduction of M → to L.
Since P SP ACE is a deterministic class, the satisfiability problem for any propositional logic having subformula property is P SP ACE-hard too.
Corollary 1 If L satisfies the subformula principle then the problem of knowing whether α, a formula of L, is satisfiable or not, is PSPACE-hard.
[ 
Discussion
The immediate application of theorem 1 is to provide arguments stating that hardly some well-known logics, as Propositional Dynamic Logic (P DL, see [3] ) and the common-knowledge epistemic logic with at least 2 agents [4] , have Natural Deduction systems satisfying the subformula principle. In [5] , for example, it is shown a Natural Deduction system for PDL, with normalization theorem. However, one of its rules, the iteration rule, does not satisfy the subformula principle in the terms stated in this article, since it is an infinitary. Anyway it does not satisfy subformula relationship between premisses and conclusion either. Besides these logics, any logic that is EXPSPACE-Hard, cannot satisfy the subformula principle too.
We have to consider the known PSPACE-Hard propositional logics. The best well-known are the Modal Logics K, S4, and KD.We know that (unlabeled) Natural Deduction systems for these logics are problematic. They fail to satisfy normalization and have rules with complex provisos. A consequence of this is that the natural reductions expected to work according the inversion principle produce derivations out of the system. Thus, the application of our technique to these logics depends on a concrete Natural Deduction system with rules that are instances of the general rules we deal with. Anyway, we already know, by other methods that these logics are PSPACE-Hard (in fact PSPACE-complete), so this application would not be worth of presenting. However, there are labeled Natural Deduction systems with normalization theorem and a related subformula lemma. For the those logics that we do not know the complexity class of provability problem, the extention of the technique presented in this article to the a kind of general labeled introduction and elimination system of rules would be worth of developing.
Conclusion and Further Investigations
We have shown that propositional logics satisfying the subformula principle have their provability problem in the class of PSPACE-Hard problems. We used a proof-theoretical analysis on a sound and complete Natural Deduction system satisfying the subformula principle for the logic. The more important consequences of our result is to show that some logics hardly satisfy the subformula principle in the terms here presented. Any propositional logic that we believe that it is beyond PSPACE-Hard cannot satisfy the subformula principle.
Our general form for introduction and elimination rules does not consider the many approaches of labeled Natural Deduction. It is our intenetion to discuss how theorem 1 can be also obtained for the usual labeled systems used to specify modal logics, namely, [6] , [10] and finaly [1] . This would be quite useful in providing a proof-theretical complexity analysis for the intuitionistic versions of Modal Logics. Besides that, extending this technique to first-order logics would be interesting too. There are decidable fragments of pure predicate (without functions and the equality "=") that are beyond PSPACE, and surely
